Historiography and Perspectives

Much of what has been written here is from the excellent Alpha History website. It is advisable to use it for other units of study too.

1. CCP or Maoist historians
2. Charles Patrick Fitzgerald
3. Immanuel Hsu
4. Maurice Meisner
5. Jonathon Spence
6. Jung Chang and Jon Halliday

CCP or Maoist Historians

• CCP or Maoist histories will point to the great leadership and talents of Mao as responsible for winning the Chinese Civil War.

• These will ignore the military prowess of Lin Biao from 1945 to 1949 and the efforts of other CCP leading officials.
• Whilst Mao was in power, these perspectives were obviously common in China. At the same time, owing to the Cold War, Western perspectives would focus on the weaknesses of the GMD as they would not want to give Communist China any credit during the Cold War.

Charles Patrick Fitzgerald

Charles Patrick Fitzgerald argues that GMD weaknesses were key reasons why the CCP was successful in the civil war. You can read more from the Alpha History website.

Immanuel Hsu

In contrast, Immanuel Hsu blames the economic state of the country rather than the actions of the GMD.

Maurice Meisner

Jonathon Spence

Mao and the CCP were successful in the civil war because:

• He established a base in Yan’an that was insulated from the war.
• “The long years of war were indeed a triumph for the Communist Party, which emerged strengthened and more numerous, with powerful effective techniques of mass mobilization in the rural settings and genuine skill at the manipulation of belief through well-conceptualized propaganda…” Mao Zedong, page 98
• In 1945, as the Soviets vacated Manchuria, the CCP were in a geographical advantageous position. From their base in Yan’an, they could move their forces into the region and take the weapons from the defeated Japanese. The region was also rich in mineral and forestry resources. They were helped in this move by the Soviets, who allowed them into the area…and therefore very useful to include in a foreign powers analysis. The arms they gained included:
  • 740 000 rifles
  • 18 000 machine guns
  • 800 aircraft
  • 4 000 artillery pieces.
  • The Soviets also helped with the airlift of CCP forces into Manchuria.
• “…Mao announced that the Communist armies were now ready to launch a ‘nationwide counteroffensive’, to seize the initiative away from the Guomindang… Each time they smashed their way into a former Guomindang area, the Communists would set up bases there, from which in turn they would launch new campaigns.”
• However, destroying the enemy and taking their weapons always took precedence over establishing these bases. Mao’s maxims were “Be sure to fight no battle unprepared, fight no battle you are not sure of winning.” His strategy also included:
  • To then fight relentlessly, giving the enemy no time to regroup.
  • To make use the captured weapons and soldiers (not the officers).
  • To take supplies from captured Guomindang areas.
  • Carry out land reform in all newly liberated areas.
• Interestingly, Spence describes how the CCP forces fought numerous battles against the Japanese to protect the peasantry. Their forces were also attacked by the Guomindang. This is very different from the arguments Chang and Halliday make in their book, Mao: The Unknown Story

Jung Chang and Jon Halliday

• The Russo-German War limited funds to the CCP so Mao opted for opium instead. It proved very successful, Russia calculating that in 1943 their sales were nearly 45 000 kg, worth $60 million ($640 million today). The opium profits allowed the Reds to ease the burdens on the peasants for a time.
• By 1944, Russia was winning against Germany and Mao decided it was the right time to go on the offensive against Japan, he would need experienced soldiers to fight Jieshi when the time came after all.
• All the denunciations, especially in Yan’an, had produced intelligence of his enemy and this continued right up until 1949 – it was a key reason why the civil war resulted in a CCP victory. ‘Moles’ played a role in all of the GMD defeats. For example, Jieshi appointed Wei Li-huang as supreme commander in 1948. He had been told, and suspected, that he was a Communist spy. Even so, he was left in charge of 550 000 of the best GMD troops.
• Stalin used the excuse of defeating Japan to create the conditions for the CCP to take power in China. On 9 August 1945, three days after the dropping of the atomic bomb over Hiroshima, 1.5 million Mongolian and Soviet troops swept into China. As soon as this happened, Mao moved his forces to link up with them and seize the territory in which they took off the Japanese – Red guerrillas were closer to Manchuria than Jieshi’s troops.

p. 347

• The Reds had no experience of modern or trench warfare, only guerrilla. Even Lin Biao had only faced the Japanese once in an ambush, the GMD commanders had experience of major battles (and with largely US-trained troops).
• Liu Shao-chi, Mao’s number 2, argued for a solid base to be built adjacent to the Russians. The troops could then be trained in modern warfare before taking on the GMD. However, Mao was too eager to take Manchuria and ordered his forces to attack. 
• The Reds performed poorly against the GMD...obviously! Moreover, Mao did not care about the injured, preferring to leave them behind whilst the rest of the army moved on.

p. 360

• The book argues that this was probably the most important decision in deciding the outcome of the civil war.
• The ceasefire ended up being four months and that the Reds were allowed to keep Manchuria. Truman threatened that if there were no moves towards peace, he would redefine the US position. This forces Jieshi to keep to the ceasefire (he needed their aid; he received nearly $3 billion for the whole civil war), although he pursued Red forces away from Manchuria. This gave Mao a secure base from which to plan the next stage of the war. In the four months, Mao integrated the 200 000 strong Manchukuo puppet army into his own. They would fight for the Reds and, perhaps more importantly, train the others. Any soldier who did not conform to their new leaders were ‘cleansed’. Mao also encouraged GMD soldiers to join the CCP – these troops were constantly short of food so this was offered.

p. 363

• The Russians also ensured the rail network was running, linking it with the Russian so that supplies could be sent.
• Under the command of Lin Biao, they began to be successful. Lin Biao became a very important figure to the Reds, his talents showing through. He attacked when it was very cold, knowing that the GMD forces would be less prepared for an offensive at that time.
• Mao’s victory was enormously helped by Jieshi’s poor judgement. He did not sack his commanders for failures and even incompetence and did not act sufficiently against the rampant corruption in the GMD.