Practices of the Chinese Civil War

Why did the GMD lose?

A. Corruption. A good example of this was when the nationalists retook Manchuria for China. Rather than make the operation strategic to the GMD cause, generals and soldiers looted the region’s cities. Much of the US aid ended up on the black market too.

B. Deteriorating support because of corruption (see above), and the delay in fighting Japan in 1937 (leading to the CCP becoming the real nationalists).

C. Distrust from communist supporters because of the White Terror, this prevented them from switching sides. Oppressive behaviour from victorious nationalist troops also led to unpopularity and declining support.

D. The GMD was divided, Jiang did not have as much control as Mao over the party. Arguably, he delegated tasks and missions too much.

E. Although the GMD had control over huge territory in the late 1940s, their forces were more spread out. This made it difficult to obtain a concentration of force and ensure his troops were supplied.

F. The GMD outnumbered the CCP at the end of the Second World War with a ratio of at least 3:1. Jiang should have won the war but the errors listed on this page contributed to his defeat.

G. Most of the GMD were conscripts, these soldiers did not have the training or sufficient morale to fight a war successfully. Desertion was a factor as a result.

H. Economics is always an issue in war. The middle and upper classes would generally support the GMD but these deteriorated because of the financial mismanagement of the government. Inflation was a huge problem and led to unpopularity for the continued war and a decline in financial support. 9 trillion yuan were in circulation in late 1946, but by August 1948 that number had increased to 700 trillion. Furthermore, Jiang was criticised because of the attacks on landlords from communist supporters and peasants, and he was unable to prevent them all. And he was also blamed for the failure to secure US aid for the Chinese economy – the withdrawal of their loans in 1947 had a huge domino effect on the country. This had huge repercussions, for example, there were daily strikes in Shanghai.

I. The US did not give sufficient support to the GMD. They withdrew their forces after Japan’s defeat and, at times, reduced the aid given to the nationalists (ending in 1948). However, US political support for action in China would be minimal and corruption was clearly a factor in their desire to continue giving aid.

J. According to Jiang, the truces allowed the communists to recover and prevent further nationalist gains. He had to abide by these truces as the US would withdraw their support .

K. Jiang took the US support for granted. He thought their cause in defeating Japan and later communism would guarantee him aid until the war was won. By breaking the truce and not being receptive to the US diplomats as he could have been, his arrogance or overconfidence led to this aid being reduced or even stopped altogether.

L. The GMD’s response to a Taiwanese uprising on February 28 1947 led to between 10 000 and 28 000 deaths. This ‘228 Incident‘ made Chinese people think of the White Terror of 1927 and ‘if’ they received news of Taiwan through communist propaganda, were less likely to support the nationalists.

Why did the CCP win?

A. Guerrilla warfare allowed them to continue as a force after military ‘defeat’ in the 1930s. Read ‘Guerrilla Warfare’ below for more information.

B. The CCP wanted to fight the Japanese imperialists before the GMD so were seen as the real ‘nationalists’.

C. Mao was head of the CCP and therefore ensured all were behind him in meeting objectives. His cult of personality (Red Star over China, Long March) also gave the soldiers both hope and faith in their leader. Furthermore, he conducted the Rectification Movement between 1941 and 1944, ensuring rivals and remove possible opponents.

D. They gave the impression of wanting to help the Chinese people. This was explained in the ‘Three Rules and Eight Points‘ of 1928, where CCP soldiers could not steal from the peasants and were ordered to treat them fairly. There was also land and tax reform (peasants no longer had to pay to their landlords). This maintained a higher morale than the GMD forces because if they fought and won, the land would be theirs! Furthermore, they were able to mobilise the peasantry to help destroy GMD communications.

E. The military leadership of Lin Biao led the CCP to convert the guerrilla army to a conventional force. This was required if they were ever to defeat the GMD army (National Revolutionary Army). He did this with the ‘aid’ of the Soviets after leaving Manchuria. This included the Red Army training the communists in how to fight a conventional strategy.

F. The CCP launched a surprise military offensive in the winter of 1947/48. It was successful because the weather usually limited conflict and the nationalists were unprepared for the attacks.

G. Intelligence. The CCP had spies in the GMD who relayed information back to them.

H. Even though the GMD were successful in 1947 in taking hundreds of towns and cities back from the communists, the CCP and their supporters were able to continue the war because they were safe in the countryside. The GMD rarely ventured out from the towns and cities.

I. Similar to point ‘C’ Mao had worked with some of his generals for up to two decades. This ensured loyalty, trust, effective communication and experience.

J. The Soviet Union gave the CCP its support during the war. In particular, they helped the Communists in the Battle for Xinjiang in1949.

Guerrilla Warfare

• Prezi
• IB Bible

Great to see genuine guerrillas talking about their experiences.

• Morale amongst the Communist guerrillas was generally high. It compared well against the incompetence, disunity and inefficiency of the Nationalists.
• Harold and Scott Boorman – this guerrilla warfare contributed significantly to the Communist victory in 1949.
• The guerrillas had both an effective military strategy and military leadership.
• The key aim was to survive as an army. This allowed for flexibility of the strategy and relied on strategic defence. It was important to maintain the military base of the guerrillas (supplies) but the force could retreat (a calculated withdrawal) from it and strike on the counter to destroy the enemy force (lull the enemy into an area where it could strike). It was harder to replace the army than it was the territory gained. This flexibility also allowed the commander of a force the freedom to operate, even when retreating they held the initiative.
• An example of when the Communist guerrillas retreated from their base was in 1947. They left their wartime base, Ya’nan.
• The strategy also meant that the Communists could choose the area in which they fought. This was usually a place where they had popular support (to maintain their supplies) and had knowledge of the battlefield.
• The strategy above lasted until 1946 when the CCP became able to use conventional tactics to defeat the Nationalists. Then the strategy was to annihilate the enemy forces; the campaigns in southern Manchuria in 1948-49 were examples of this.
• As part of this new strategy, guerrilla groups aimed to separate Nationalist units from each other by destroying their communications. This was achieved through harassment, ambush or sabotage. However, this was different from the Soviet partisans as they followed this up by attempting to encircle and destroy the enemy units. A key focus in this time was the encirclement.
• The guerrilla units, usually small, operated independently from each other. This made it more difficult for the Nationalists to destroy them, their communications were not linked. However, their political control and military strategy from 1935 came from Mao. He published documents outlining how the guerrillas should fight the Nationalists and later the Japanese. He had no military training but was able to think strategically (economic, political and military). This control meant that there was a stable and consistent strategy, very different from the Nationalists.
• Intelligence for the guerrillas was usually accurate and detailed.
• Technology – fighters generally did not have heavy weapons or any modern communications and transport.
• The Nationalists, and later the Japanese, had little experience of fighting guerrillas.
• The morale of the conventional soldier would suffer because the enemy could not be completely defeated.
• The Communist guerrillas were not the reason the CCP achieved victory in 1949 but they certainly contributed. The key evidence is that they survived, adapting to circumstances to do so. And when conditions favoured them, they grew in number and adapted again to become a conventional force capable of defeating the Nationalists.

Perspectives

Resources

Marshall and China

Historiography

If history is written by the victors, this may explain why the nationalist armies were so corrupt, ill-disciplined and were prone to desertion. The communists controlled the narrative of the war after 1949 so, as a historian, you need to factor this in when using any source material on the war.

Perhaps a generalisation but accessing Chinese sources is not as easy as other countries because of political reasons. The perception is that the CCP, still in power, want to protect their reputation and their rationale to govern. However, since Mao’s death in 1976, there has been a debate on his role in building China and his role in the victory of the CCP. This is more prevalent since 1997 and the death of Mao’s successor, Deng Xiaoping.

The Chinese language is generally seen as Mandarin today but this ignores the vast number which were spoken throughout the country at the beginning of the twentieth century. Translating all of these present their own problems, from a dialect to Mandarin and then to other languages if Chinese history is to be studied. Consequently, this is a limitation of understanding sources.

The Marxist theory of Mao’s revolution is generally critical because it was not the proletariat (workers) who overcame capitalism for communism but rather the peasantry. Marx advocated a mass proletariat from an industrial society seizing control of the means of production. China did not have either. Consequently, one could argue that Mao was an opportunist, using the Marxist ideology to build a movement, rid the country of foreigners and take power.

The Maoist or CCP perspectives are obviously sympathetic to his role in achieving victory over the GMD. They promote and glorify Mao’s leadership of the Red Army, the Jiangxi Soviet, the Long March, and the Yan’an Soviet. It was his genius that both the Nationalists and the Japanese were defeated.

The Western perspectives of the Chinese Civil War were shaped by the Cold War for decades afterwards. Jiang was the legitimate ruler and so Taiwan had political support during the Cold War (he fled China to Taiwan after 1949).

The Post-Revisionist historians reevaluated Mao. This allowed for some very critical studies such as Jung Chang‘s Mao: the Unknown Story, published in 2005. This argued that he had no regard for peasants or Chinese people, only his image and how much power he possessed.

J. Hans Van de Ven takes the role of the Japanese and the effects of geography even further by stating that the Japanese invasion was hugely beneficial for the CCP. Van de Ven states that the Japanese invasion significantly weakened the KMT government, for the majority of the fighting occurred in the KMT controlled south and east of the country. He also explains that the CCP had better tactics, guerrilla warfare being one of them.

Benjamin Yang argues that the north of China was more unstable than the south so it was more susceptible to Mao’s ideology. He was able to grow his support as a result and establish strongholds and bases.

Martin Wilbur and Julie How argue that the flexibility and quality of CCP leaders helped grow and maintain their support of the peasantry during the war. They were able to organise large numbers of people and organise land reforms to ensure loyalty.

Chinese Revolution historiography

http://stimulatedboredom.com/history/the-making-of-red-china-a-historiographical-analysis-of-the-chinese-civil-war/

Thesis Statements

The GMD lost the Chinese Civil War because they relied on the support of the US. When it was withdrawn, partly because of their own actions, defeat became more likely.

The CCP was able to survive all attempts to destroy them as their support was in the countryside and the GMD’s conventional forces found it difficult to fight against the guerrillas.

Student A – The CCP won the Chinese Civil War because of the brilliance of Mao. His strategies of guerrilla warfare and ensuring the communists maintained their support in the countryside were the key reasons.

Student B – The GMD lost because of a declining lack of support through corruption and economic failures. Both applied to the Chinese population but the former was responsible for the US reducing its aid to the nationalists.

Student C –

Student D –